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Abstract 
 
 
We compute some indicators (zero-trade, turnover ratio, Amihud price impact, and Roll bid-ask 
spread) to examine the liquidity conditions of corporate bonds traded on the main Italian retail bond 
markets from January 2010 to June 2013. In order to compare market liquidity for identical 
securities, our analysis focuses on fragmented bonds, i.e. bonds traded concurrently on two different 
venues: either DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, or ExtraMOT and EuroTLX. As for bonds traded on 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, the Amihud and the Roll statistics suggest EuroTLX being more 
liquid. Moreover, irrespective of the trading venue, on average bank bonds are less liquid than 
bonds issued by non-financial companies, especially from 2011 due to the impact of the sovereign 
debt crisis. With regard to bonds traded across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, the latter is characterized 
by better liquidity conditions, with bank bonds being more liquid than non-financial ones. 
Furthermore, we find evidence of better liquidity figures for Italian bonds (nationality), structured 
bonds (complexity), and securities with greater minimum trading size (MTS). We also find that 
bonds’ features (issuers’ nationality and industry; bonds’ residual maturity, complexity, rating, 
etc…) affect liquidity differently depending upon the trading venue, thus supporting the view that 
market microstructure may play a relevant role. Finally, we investigate the effect of fragmentation 
by comparing the liquidity of dual-listed bank bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and 
EuroTLX with otherwise similar bank bonds traded exclusively on DomesticMOT. Italian 
fragmented bank bonds turn out to be slightly more liquid than similar Italian bonds traded 
exclusively on DomesticMOT; whereas, the opposite holds for foreign bank bonds. However, 
overall there is not a clear-cut evidence on the effect of fragmentation on bond liquidity, probably 
because it is intertwined with bonds’ attributes, such as the issue size (in our sample, higher for the 
Italian bank bonds).  
 
 
JEL Classification: G01, G10, G12, G18 
Keywords: liquidity risk, dual-listed bonds, corporate bonds, market microstructure. 
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1 Introduction 
The determinants of liquidity of corporate bonds have long been of interest for regulators and 
academics. Although the definition of liquidity is straightforward since it is the ability to trade 
quickly at a low cost (O’Hara, 1995), liquidity measurement is still quite challenging. Different 
indicators have been proposed to capture some relevant aspects affecting liquidity: immediacy (the 
speed of orders execution), tightness (transaction costs), market depth (size of the order needed to 
move the price), and price impact (the price change following the execution of orders of a certain 
amount). Liquidity indicators can be computed following either a trade-based or an order-based 
approach, broadly defined as ex-ante and ex-post measures, respectively. 
Liquidity is crucial for any investor who has to determine the size, the timing, and the venue of 
orders execution. In the European framework, the choice of the trading venue has become relevant 
especially since the introduction of the Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID henceforth) in November 
2007. MiFID set a new regulation of trading venues1 and envisaged the abolition of the so called 
“concentration rule” (whereby investment firms were required to route clients’ orders to regulated 
markets only). The new legislative framework aims at promoting competition and, through such a 
way, enhancing investors’ protection. 
When transposing MiFID to the national law system, Italy decided to extend both pre- and post-
trade transparency rules to non-equity markets, although the Directive envisaged such rules for 
equity markets only. Moreover, the Italian securities regulator (CONSOB) issued a specific 
regulation, recommending intermediaries to adopt firm transparency measures within the 
distribution process of illiquid products (bank bonds, financial insurance products and derivatives)2 
to retail customers. The massive participation of retail investors to Italian bond markets has 
contributed to shape the Italian legal framework. As a matter of fact, direct retail holdings of 
corporate bonds, especially bank securities, are far more extensive in Italy than in other EU 
countries.3 For these reasons, corporate bond markets accessible by retail investors have 
proliferated. Nevertheless, both illiquidity and infrequent trading still remain open issues and 
represent significant risk factors undermining investors’ protection. 
Bonds can be traded on more than one venue, thus raising the question about whether, and to what 
extent, fragmentation affects liquidity. Therefore, fragmentation of corporate bonds across multiple 
trading venues remains a key policy issue in Italy. On the one hand, fragmentation may affect 
liquidity and, in turn, the position of retail investors willing to sell securities at a fair price. On the 
other hand, the point is relevant for issuers as well, since liquid markets may encourage firms to 
raise debt capital, a strategic opportunity to accomplish effective diversification of funding sources. 
This paper investigates both the liquidity conditions and the determinants of trading of dual-listed 
bonds (henceforth, also fragmented bonds, i.e. bonds whose trade takes place concurrently on two 
different trading venues). In particular, we analyze the liquidity of 409 bonds traded on EuroTLX (a 
multilateral trading facility -MTF-) and either on DomesticMOT (a regulated market) or on 
ExtraMOT (MTF) from January 2010 to June 2013. Since bonds traded on DomesticMOT cannot 
be exchanged on ExtraMOT (and vice-versa) during the observed period, there are two samples of 
 
1 In particular, the trading venues were classified into regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and 
systematic internalizers. 
2 Communication no. 9019104, “The duty of the intermediary to act with due correctness and transparency on 
distribution of illiquid financial products” (2 March 2009). The Communication is part of the MiFID “level 3” 
measures for the Intermediaries’ Regulation. The key point is that investors should be allowed to disinvest at a fair price 
and within a reasonable period of time. 
3 At the end of 2013 Italian households’ direct investment in corporate bonds accounted for about 14% of their financial 
wealth, equivalent to the figure referred to the Italian government bonds (Consob, 2013). 
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dual-traded securities: the first sample includes bonds traded across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX; 
the second sample includes bonds traded on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX.  
We consider four indicators to measure liquidity: 1) the percentage of non-trading days (the zero-
trade statistics); 2) the turnover ratio (i.e. the ratio between turnover and the outstanding amount); 
3) the price impact (the Amihud statistics); 4) the bid-ask spread estimated using the Roll statistics.
4
 
Liquidity levels of bonds traded on both DomesticMOT and EuroTLX are similar across the two 
venues when using the zero-trade indicator and the turnover ratio; whereas, liquidity figures are 
better on EuroTLX if we consider the price impact (Amihud) and trading costs (Roll spread). Bank 
bonds (87% of the sample) are the main driver of such an outcome. On the contrary, non-financial 
bonds traded on DomesticMOT tend to be more liquid than those traded on EuroTLX.  
On average, EuroTLX turn out to be more liquid for bonds traded across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX. 
In addition, irrespective of the trading venue, on average bank bonds seem to be more liquid than 
non-financial bonds; however, bank bonds become less liquid than non-financial bonds during the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
Differences in the liquidity of dual-listed bonds across trading venues might depend on 
microstructural features. We find that securities’ characteristics (such as minimum trading size, 
coupon type, complexity, issuer sector and nationality) may impact differently on liquidity 
measures depending upon the trading venue, thus suggesting that market microstructure plays a 
relevant role. Such an evidence is corroborated by the multivariate analysis (controlling for bond 
features, liquidity conditions change across trading venues).  
Finally, the paper sheds light on the effect of fragmentation by comparing liquidity levels of bank 
bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX with otherwise similar bank bonds traded on 
DomesticMOT only. We show that bonds issued by Italian banks traded both in DomesticMOT and 
EuroTLX exhibit similar or higher liquidity (depending on the measure adopted) than otherwise 
similar Italian bank bonds traded exclusively on DomesticMOT; whereas, the opposite holds for 
bonds issued by foreign banks. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the liquidity of dual-listed bonds and the 
effect of fragmentation on retail corporate bond markets, thus providing new empirical evidence on 
the contribution of transparency and market microstructure rules on the development of an 
integrated secondary market. Indeed, so far, given the size of the Italian public debt, the vast 
majority of the studies on the Italian case have focused on institutional trading on the government 
bond market, leaving overshadowed the retail side. In this respect, our paper has important policy 
implications given that the recent MiFID review envisages greater transparency in non-equity 
markets.5 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional features and the 
microstructure of DomesticMOT, ExtraMOT and EuroTLX. In Section 3 we describe the dataset. 
Liquidity indicators and figures are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 a random effect panel logit 
model is applied to examine the determinants of the probability of trading across the different 
trading venues. Section 6 employs a matched sample approach to analyze the impact of 
fragmentation on liquidity for a sample of bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
4 The use of all these indicators is supported by the principal component analysis since liquidity of dual-listed bonds 
cannot be effectively summarized by one single indicator over the sample period. Liquidity appears to result from the 
even contribution of the four measures. 
5 Discussion paper available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2014 548_discussion_paper_mifid-mifir.pdf. 
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2 The Italian corporate bond markets: institutional and microstructural 
features 
DomesticMOT, ExtraMOT, and EuroTLX are the main Italian trading venues for retail investors to 
trade corporate bonds.6 MOT and ExtraMOT (respectively, a regulated market and a MTF) are 
owned and managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.; while EuroTLX (a MTF) was owned by two major 
Italian bank groups (Unicredit and Intesa SanPaolo through Banca IMI Spa) till September 2013, 
when Borsa Italiana bought a majority stake.  
Established in 1994, MOT is a regulated market split in two segments: DomesticMOT and 
EuroMOT. MOT trades both Italian and foreign government securities, corporate bonds issued by 
both domestic and foreign companies, supranational and asset-backed securities.7 
ExtraMOT was launched in 2009. Bonds and other debt securities are admitted to trading on 
ExtraMOT at the proposal of Borsa Italiana S.p.A. or at the request of an intermediary. Admission 
is allowed provided securities are already traded on a regulated market. However, since May 2011, 
unlisted bank bonds can also be admitted to trading on ExtraMOT upon request of the issuer.  
The regulatory framework of the Italian bond markets is set by the MiFID and by the Italian law 
(Testo unico della finanza - Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation). As said, MiFID 
abolished the concentration rule and set mandatory pre- and post-trade transparency obligations for 
equity markets. However, member States were allowed to extend such rules to non-equity 
platforms.8 Accordingly, the Italian legislator opted for such an extension when transposing MiFID 
into the national system and CONSOB issued more detailed regulation. The Authority adopted a 
“flexible approach” whereby regulated markets (MTFs and systemic internalizers -Sis-) were 
required to establish and maintain differentiated transparency regimes. MTFs could set weaker 
requirements provided instruments were already listed on a regulated market. In addition, all trading 
venues were allowed to design their own pre-trade transparency rules taking into account the 
microstructure, the type of the financial instrument, the amount traded, and the market type.9 
All bond markets managed by Borsa Italiana (DomesticMOT and ExtraMOT) are order-driven 
markets. On DomesticMOT, it is envisaged the optional presence of a liquidity provider (or 
specialist), subject to specific minimum mandatory trading quantity quotations.10 Such a 
requirement holds also for ExtraMOT, where the intermediary that has requested admission to 
trading of a certain security shall act itself as a specialist for such financial instrument.11 Trading 
takes place during an opening auction phase (from 8:00 am to 9:00 am) and a continuous trading 
phase (from 9:00 am to 5:30 pm). Borsa Italiana establishes the minimum trading size consistently 
with the minimum lot size laid down in the bond rules and considering, among other things, cost 
effectiveness in order execution. 
The microstructure of EuroTLX is hybrid, combining both order and quote driven features. 
Liquidity is guaranteed both by a competitive and continuous auction mechanism (orders and 
quotes are matched according to price and time priority) and by the presence of (at least) one 
 
6  We ruled out the fourth trading venue for corporate bonds (HI-MTF) given its negligible market share. 
7  Monte Titoli clears trades on DomesticMOT, while Euroclear and Clearstream clears trades on EuroMOT. 
8  See art. 27-30 and 44-45 of Directive 2004/39/EC, and Chapter IV (on Transparency) of Commission Regulation (EC 
N° 1287/2006).  
9 See art. 79-bis, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 24 February 1998 - Consolidated Law on Financial 
Intermediation. Consob implemented this faculty in artt. 32 -34 of its Markets Regulation n. 16191 of 29 October 2007. 
10  See for instance art. 4.4.1 of 2014 Borsa Italiana Market Rules. 
11 See art. 300 on ExtraMOT 2010 Market Rules. Currently (2014) the specialist requirements apply also to financial 
instruments listed at issuers’ request.  
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liquidity provider for each financial instrument12. The liquidity provider must quote continuously a 
minimum quantity13 during trading hours (from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm -in our sample period-).14  
Financial instruments are assumed to be liquid when admitted to trading on EuroTLX, but they may 
become illiquid afterwards. Should it happens, EuroTLX informs all direct members about liquidity 
conditions of the financial instrument. Also Borsa Italiana, on a monthly basis, provides the same 
information through a performance indicator available to the specialists operating on ExtraMOT.15 
As pointed out later (Section 4), these institutional features may play a role in affecting the liquidity 
level of the trading venues. 
Finally, between January 2010 and June 2013, the market rules of the trading platforms have been 
updated or modified rather frequently, as well as the technical infrastructure supporting trading 
activity. The most relevant episode has been the migration of trading from TradElect to Millennium 
electronic platform for all of Borsa Italiana cash markets in mid-2012. However, given that the 
majority of these changes occurred during the financial crisis, it is difficult to disentangle their 
impact on liquidity levels from the effect of market turbulences. 
 
 
3 The Italian dual-listed corporate bonds: the data set  
The analysis developed in the next two Sections focuses on 409 dual-listed corporate bonds over the 
period January 2010 - June 2013. Dual-listed bonds are securities traded across two venues: either 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, or ExtraMOT and EuroTLX (see Appendix 1 for more details on the 
sample).16 Venues pairs are identified by taking into account that a bond listed on DomesticMOT 
cannot be traded on ExtraMOT and vice versa. The sample period starts from January 2010 because 
the ExtraMOT segment was launched in the second half of 2009.  
During the sample period, 100 bonds are traded across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, while 309 
securities are fragmented over ExtraMOT and EuroTLX (Table 1). Most of the bonds negotiated on 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX are issued by banks (87%), while the reverse holds for the securities 
negotiated on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX (66% of bonds issued by non-financial firms).17 In terms of 
trading volume, our sample is quite representative of the whole market, covering 37% of total 
trading for DomesticMOT, 95% for ExtraMOT and 26% for EuroTLX. 
 
12 According to art. 2.2.2 of 2014 Market Rules (formerly art. 2.3.7 of TLX 2010 Market Rules), liquidity providers 
can operate as type-A market maker (with quote obligations for at least 250 securities already in 2010), or type-B 
market maker (currently with obligations for at least 30 securities), or as specialist. A specialist is a market member 
who undertakes to observe EuroTLX liquidity requirements solely with regard to (certificates and/or covered warrants 
and/or) bank bonds other than Eurobonds and/or other bonds: (i) issued by the same or by its controlled, controlling or 
affiliated company, or (ii) issued by other banking entities and placed by the Specialist or by its controlled, controlling 
or affiliated company among its clients or clients of such controlled, controlling or affiliated company or such company 
being part of the same banking group, or (iii) with regard to which any of the above mentioned entities committed itself 
vis-à-vis the issuer, other than a sovereign or a supranational entity or an agency, and/or vis-à-vis the intermediary to 
provide liquidity of the financial instrument in the secondary market. See definitions on TLX 2010 - 2013 Market 
Rules, in particular art. 3.32 for specific obligations/waivers and submission of bid offers only. 
13  See art. 3.23 on TLX 2010 - 2013 Market Rules. 
14 In 2010-2013, non-Eurobond bank bonds ended trading 30 minutes earlier (at 17:30). Currently (2014), continuous 
trading on EuroTLX takes place from 9:00 to 17:30. 
15 The indicator is a weighted average of the percentage of time of compliance with respect to quote obligation and, as 
far as the assessment of the compliance to the requirements set by Borsa Italiana is concerned, should not fall below 
90%. See art. 14 of ExtraMOT Market Instructions (2010). 
16 Such bonds can also be traded on other venues ruled out as they account for a marginal share of executed trade. 
17 The sample included two bonds issued by insurance companies (we ruled them out). 
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During the sample period, on average non-financial bonds show higher residual maturity than bank 
bonds in all trading venues both for the whole market and for our sample (Figure 1). In particular, at 
the market level, maturity ranges from 4.9 to 5.6 years for non-financial bonds (respectively, on 
EuroTLX and DomesticMOT), and from 2.8 to 4.4 years for bank securities (respectively, 
EuroTLX and DomesticMOT). At sample level, data show similar features.18  
 
 
 
We also track data on minimum trading size (MTS), in order to test whether bonds exposed to retail 
trading (i.e. securities with MTS equal to 1,000 euros) are less frequently traded than bonds with 
higher MTS (typically 50,000 or 100,000 euros). When considering the whole market, bonds with 
1,000 euros MTS represent more than 90% of total non-government bond turnover on 
DomesticMOT, 66% on EuroTLX, and 16% on ExtraMOT (Figure 2). Breaking these figures down 
by the issuer industry, bank bonds with 1,000 euros MTS account for 91% of total bank bonds 
 
18 This evidence is also mirrored by the data on the maturity at issuance (available upon request). In particular, both at 
the market and at the sample level, maturity at issuance ranges from around 5 to 6 years for bank bonds (respectively, 
on EuroTLX and DomesticMOT), and from around 7 to almost 8 years for non-financial securities (respectively, 
DomesticMOT and ExtraMOT). 
Table 1 – Corporate bond turnover by trading venue and issuer sector  
(January 2010 – June 2013; monetary values in million of euros)  
market issuer 
sector  
whole market  sample 
n° of bonds turnover weight  n° of bonds turnover weight 
coverage of 
market 
turnover 
DomesticMOT bank 792 43.304 81.9%  87 10.019 51.8% 23.1% 
 
non-
financial 
18 9.581 18.1%  13 9.334 48.2% 97.4% 
 total 810 52.885 100.0%  100 19.353 100.0% 36.6% 
ExtraMOT bank 109 4.926 44.9%  104 4.833 46.4% 98.1% 
 
non-
financial 
216 6.041 55.1%  205 5.581 53.6% 92.4% 
 total 325 10.967 100.0%  309 10.414 100.0% 95.0% 
EuroTLX bank 4.635 136.898 81.0%  191 23.133 53.5% 16.9% 
 
non-
financial 
1.219 32.069 19.0%  218 20.114 46.5% 62.7% 
 total 5.854 168.967 100.0%  409 43.247 100.0% 25.6% 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Consob internal database. 
Figure 1 – Bond average residual maturity by trading venue and issuer sector  
(January 2010 – June 2013; market and sample figures) 
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turnover on DomesticMOT, 72% on EuroTLX and 7% ExtraMOT; for non-financial issuers these 
figures are equal, respectively, to 51%, 47% and 24%. At the sample level, data exhibit a similar 
pattern, given that total turnover on DomesticMOT is almost entirely related to bonds with MTS 
equal to 1,000 euros, while bonds with a higher MTS capture a much larger share of trading volume 
on EuroTLX (30%) and on ExtraMOT (83%). Hence, data indicate a much greater presence of 
retail investors on DomesticMOT than on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX. 
 
 
Breaking down the turnover by issuer nationality, sample statistics are overall consistent with whole 
market data, apart from bank bonds traded in DomesticMOT (in our sample, Italian securities are 
overweighed) and non-financial bonds traded in EuroTLX (in our sample, Italian securities are 
overweighed; Figure 3).19  
 
 
As far as the coupon structure is concerned, our sample tracks closely the whole market. On 
DomesticMOT, bank bonds are mainly represented by structured products20 (48% of bank bond 
turnover), followed by fixed (30%) and floating (22%) rate securities; whilst, fixed coupon bonds 
 
19  For the identification of the issuer nationality, see Appendix 1. 
20  Incorporating a derivative or stochastic component. 
Figure 2 – Bond minimum trading size by trading venue and issuer sector  
(January 2010 – June 2013; market and sample figures in percentage of turnover) 
Minimum trading size =1,000 euro 
 
 
Figure 3 – Bond issuer nationality by trading venue and issuer sector  
(January 2010 – June 2013; market and sample figures in percentage of turnover)  
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predominate in the non-financial sector (Figure 4). Coupon structures look more conservative on 
ExtraMOT, since the turnover is mainly due to fixed rate coupon products (98% for bank bonds and 
83% for non-financial bonds respectively). On EuroTLX, fixed coupon bank bonds account for 
47% of the turnover, followed by structured products (37%), and floating rate bonds (16%).  
 
 
Finally, Figure 5 shows the distribution of bonds’ trading volumes in our sample by official rating. 
The turnover of Top rated (A–AAA) bank bonds is significantly greater than the turnover of bonds 
with lower ratings a (B – BBB class) on both EuroTLX and ExtraMOT. On the contrary, B–BBB 
bonds show a higher turnover than top rated instruments on both EuroTLX and ExtraMOT. 21 As 
for DomesticMOT, all sample issues but one, belonging to rated issuers (mainly primary banks), 
were found to be not rated individually. 
 
 
21 We refer to the rating released by Moody’s. Overall, rated securities account for roughly 43% of the total turnover 
on EuroTLX and ExtraMOT, while B–BBB rated bonds represent respectively 37% and 51% of turnover on EuroTLX 
and ExtraMOT subsamples. 
Figure 4 – Bond coupon structure by trading venues and issuer sector  
(January 2010 – June 2013; market and sample figures in percentage of turnover)  
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Dual-listed bonds by issue ratings, trading venues and issuer sector  
(January 2010 – June 2013; in percentage of turnover; number of bonds are reported) 
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4 Liquidity of the Italian dual-listed corporate bonds  
When measuring liquidity22, academics and practitioners have long referred to three main concepts: 
depth, resiliency and tightness. Depth is related to the orders’ size. Resiliency measures the price 
adjustments in response to a large order flows; so that it depends on the elasticity of supply and 
demand. Tightness proxies the trading costs incurred by investors in terms of immediacy, i.e. the 
costs associated to the time interval elapsing before incoming market orders are executed. Finally, a 
straight liquidity indicator is represented by trading frequency (number of trades per unit of time). 
In this paper, we rely on four widely used liquidity indicators. First, in order to account for the 
depth of the order book we used the turnover ratio: 
 V = V = p ∗ TV/AOi 
 
where p and TV are respectively the price and the traded volume of bond i on day d; AOi is the 
outstanding amount of bond i. The deeper the order book, the higher the trading volume and, 
consequently, the turnover ratio. As argued by several authors (Alexander et al., 2000), low trading 
volume is important because it affects the inventory carrying costs of dealers, who pass them on to 
investors (as transaction costs). In response, investors command higher returns thus raising the cost 
of debt capital to issuers. However, as shown by empirical evidence on the US markets, trading volume 
and turnover ratio tends to rise with default risk, interest rate risk, and returns volatility, and therefore, 
when using trading volume as a proxy for liquidity, one needs to control also for these factors.  
The standard measure for resiliency is the Amihud (2002) price impact indicator: 
 
Illiq = |r|TV 
 
where r is the return of bond i on day d, while TV is the daily volume of the same security on the 
same day. In a liquid market, large orders should not lead to significant price changes. 
In order to capture tightness, we compute the Roll (1984) indicator which can be regarded as a 
proxy for the bid-ask spread; Roll suggests using twice the square root of the covariance between 
consecutive daily price changes (Δp, Δp): 
 
S = 2 – Cov(Δp, Δp). 
 
Finally, trading frequency is captured by a zero-trade day statistics: 
 
Z = NZRT  
 
 
22 For a discussion on liquidity measurement see Beber and Pagano (2008), Fleming (2003), Bao et al., (2008), 
Goyenko et al. (2009), Sarr and Lybek (2002), Lesmond et al. (1999), Hasbrouck (2004, 2009) and Lesmond (2005). 
Among the most recent contributions, based on the principal component analysis, see Nielsen et al. (2012), who obtain 
an efficient proxy of liquidity by using four indicators: Amihud (2002), implicit trading costs, turnover and zero-trade 
days proxies. In this work the choice of liquidity indicators has also been forced by data limitations. For instance, we 
could not compute measures based on the actual bid-ask spread since we do not have access to order data.  
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where NZR is the number of days with no trades and T is the total number of trading days in the 
sample period.23 
 
The liquidity of dual-listed bonds across trading venues 
We look at the liquidity levels of the dual-listed corporate bonds over the period January 1, 2010 - 
June 30, 2013. A t-test on the difference between the means of the aforementioned indicators has 
been performed to check whether the liquidity of bonds in our sample is different across venues 
(Table 2).24 Then, for each trading venue we check whether liquidity differs between bank and non-
financial bonds.  
With the exception of non-financial bonds traded on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX that are 
frequently exchanged, Table 2 shows that all the other bonds trade quite infrequently, since the 
average zero-trade statistics ranges between 30% and 75% depending on the trading venue.25 
 
 
 
23 For all the indicators, we took the monthly averages of the daily measures within the sample period. Except for the 
turnover ratio, they should be interpreted as illiquidity indicators, i.e. liquidity decreases as they increase. 
24 As a robustness check we performed both an independent and a dependent sample t-test. The t-test has been 
performed also on a monthly basis, with results similar to those reported in Appendix 3. 
25 On DomesticMOT the monthly average of zero-trade rises from 36% in 2010 to 46% at the end of June 2013 (in 
2010 the average number of no-trading days over a month was almost 8, while it became 10 at the end of June 2013). 
On EuroTLX, the zero-trade indicator goes from about 18% in 2010 to 68% in the first half of 2013 (over the sample 
period the average number of no trading days on EuroTLX rose from 4 to 15). As for dual-listed bonds traded across 
ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, during the sample period the percentage of days with no trade in a month is permanently 
higher on ExtraMOT (both for bank and for non-financial bonds); while, on EuroTLX zero-trade increased from 20% to 
more than 50% for bank bonds and from 30% to 70% for non-financial securities.  
Table 2 – Liquidity indicators of dual-listed bonds by trading venue and issuer sector  
(average percentage values over the period January 1, 2010 – June 30, 2013)  
 
DomesticMOT vs EuroTLX 
 
whole sample 
(n = 100) 
bank bonds subsample 
(n = 87) 
non-financial bonds subsample 
(n = 13) 
liquidity indicator Amihud Roll Turnover 
Zero-
trade 
Amihud Roll Turnover 
Zero-
trade 
Amihud Roll Turnover Zero-trade 
DomesticMOT (a) 22.2% 47.9% 1.9% 28.9% 23.3% 53.2% 1.8% 33.6% 0.5% 23.6% 2.1% 0.2% 
TLX (b) 8.8% 27.2% 1.6% 33.0% 11.6% 28.3% 1.7% 39.4% 1.4% 20.4% 0.8% 1.2% 
(a) – (b) significant
1
 (*) (*) 
  
(*) (*) 
  
(*) 
 
(*) (*) 
result 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
same 
liquidity 
same 
liquidity 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
same 
liquidity 
same 
liquidity 
MOT 
more 
liquid 
same 
liquidity 
MOT 
more 
liquid 
MOT 
more 
liquid 
 
 
ExtraMOT vs EuroTLX 
 
whole sample 
(n = 309) 
bank bonds subsample 
(n = 104) 
non-financial bonds subsample 
(n = 205) 
liquidity indicator Amihud Roll Turnover 
Zero-
trade 
Amihud Roll Turnover 
Zero-
trade 
Amihud Roll Turnover Zero-trade 
ExtraMOT (a) 28.9% 16.6% 0.1% 73.8% 16.3% 16.5% 0.2% 71.3% 35.8% 16.7% 0.1% 75.0% 
TLX (b) 6.3% 25.1% 0.4% 48.1% 4.4% 26.7% 0.7% 43.5% 7.3% 24.3% 0.3% 50.4% 
(a) – (b) significant
1
 (*) 
 
(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) 
result 
TLX more 
liquid 
same 
liquidity 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
ExtraMOT 
more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
ExtraMOT 
more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
TLX more 
liquid 
 
Source: our elaborations on Consob database. 
1 
Sample average of the liquidity indicators computed on monthly data and in 
percentage values. N = number of bonds dual-listed on each pair of trading venues. (*) = Null hypothesis rejected at 95% 
confidence level. Higher values for Amihud, Roll, zero-trade indicators mean lower liquidity levels. 
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Basically, both the zero-trade indicator and the turnover ratio suggest that liquidity of dual-listed 
bonds is not significantly different between DomesticMOT and EuroTLX; while, liquidity is higher 
on EuroTLX when measured by both the Amihud and the Roll statistics. Similar evidence holds 
also for the subsample of bank bonds. For non-financial securities, instead, three out of four 
liquidity measures suggest liquidity being higher on DomesticMOT than on EuroTLX. The Roll 
indicator is not significantly different across the two venues26. The time series evolution of the 
liquidity indicator is reported in Figure 6 (monthly average liquidity levels by venue and sector over 
the sample time period).27  
For each trading venue, we also check whether liquidity differs significantly between bank bonds 
and non-financial corporate bonds, through a t-test for the significance of the difference between the 
means. Over the sample period, liquidity as measured by Amihud, Roll and zero-trade statistics 
turns out to be always significantly different across bank and non-financial bonds (while the 
evidence is less clear-cut for the turnover ratio), being the former less liquid than the latter.  
Although with different intensity, liquidity conditions deteriorated on both trading venues both in 
the second half of 2011 (when the sovereign debt crisis reached its peak) and in the first half of 
2012 (when market turbulences revived). 
Taking the sub-sample of bonds traded on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, we find that the former venue 
is basically less liquid than the latter; contrarian evidence is supported by the Roll indicator only. 
This might be partly due to the fact that the presence of a liquidity provider is optional on 
ExtraMOT, whereas it is compulsory on EuroTLX, as discussed in Section 2. Moreover, bank 
bonds are more liquid than non-financial securities according to all indicators except for Roll. 
Figure 7 shows that during the sovereign debt crisis, bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT and 
EuroTLX experienced a significant liquidity deterioration; at the end of June 2013 liquidity levels 
were still lower than in 2010.  
Difference in liquidity of dual-listed bonds should be driven essentially by differences in the 
microstructure of the trading venues. To gain some insight on this, we carried out a descriptive 
analysis of liquidity with respect to venues, controlling for four bonds’ characteristics, i.e. the 
minimum trading size (MTS), issuer’s nationality, coupon complexity and issuer’s industry 
sector.28 We find that bonds features may impact differently on liquidity depending on the trading 
venue, thus suggesting that the way microstructural differences influence liquidity is not 
straightforward and relates to bonds attributes as well. 
 
 
26 As for the t-test performed on a monthly basis, the Roll indicator would point to higher liquidity on DomesticMOT, 
although discontinuously. 
27 This evidence has to be interpreted cautiously since it refers to a very small sample (13 bonds; left hand side graphs). 
However, as already shown in Table 3, such sample accounts for more than 70% of the non-financial bonds listed on 
DomesticMOT and for more than 97% of the turnover of the whole market segment.  
28 We also investigated the relationship between liquidity levels and issue size. However, because of the low variability 
in this attribute (since all bonds in our sample have a quite small issue size), no clear pattern was found.  
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Figure 6 – Average liquidity levels of dual-listed bonds on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX 
(monthly averages; percentage values) 
Zero-trade 
 
Turnover ratio 
 
Amihud ratio 
 
Roll indicator 
 
Source: our elaborations on CONSOB internal database on trading data. Indicators reported in the left graphs are calculated on a 
sample including 87 bank bonds traded across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, while the indicators reported in the right graphs are 
computed on a sample including 13 non-financial bonds traded across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX. 
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Figure 7 – Average liquidity levels of dual-listed bonds on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX 
(monthly averages; percentage values) 
Zero-trade 
 
Turnover ratio 
 
Amihud ratio 
 
Roll indicator 
 
Source: our elaborations on CONSOB internal database on trading data. Indicators reported in the left graphs are calculated  on a 
sample including 104 bank bonds traded across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, while the indicators reported in the right graphs are 
computed on a sample including 205 non-financial bonds traded across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX. 
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As for MTS, since almost all bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX have MTS 
equal to 1,000 euro (so called retail bonds), the analysis will focus only on bonds traded across 
EuroTLX and ExtraMOT.  
Using a t-test for the means, we test whether the liquidity differs across trading venues, controlling 
for issuer’s industry sector and MTS. On average, as expected, a higher MTS is associated with 
better liquidity. Both the Amihud statistics and the turnover ratio suggest both financial and non-
financial bonds with greater lot size (MTS > 1,000  euros) being more liquid. Such evidence implies 
that retail bonds have always a higher price impact indicator. The Roll bid-ask spread and the zero-
trade statistics (roughly) support the evidence of similar liquidity conditions in spite of the 
minimum lot size. (Appendix 2, Table a2.1).  
As for securities traded on both DomesticMOT and ExtraMOT, with the only exception of non-
financial bonds traded on EuroTLX, the t-test for the mean provides clear-cut evidence that bonds 
issued by Italian companies are characterized by better liquidity levels; just the Roll spread 
sometimes captures similar liquidity levels (Appendix 2, Table a2.2, top panel). This evidence may 
eventually raise the issue of home-country bias. 
Moreover, as for securities traded on both ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, Italian bonds are almost 
always significantly more liquid than foreign bonds on both venues.29 Overall, domestic bonds 
seem to be more liquid than the foreign securities with respect to almost all the liquidity indicators 
and especially to the zero-trade index (Appendix 2, Table a2.2, bottom panel; if not otherwise 
specified, Table sections without available data are omitted).30 
Finally, as for coupon complexity, on average bank plain vanilla bonds traded on DomesticMOT 
and EuroTLX are more liquid than structured bonds on DomesticMOT when turnover ratio and 
zero-trade are used. However, the same securities compare differently on EuroTLX, with structured 
bonds being more liquid than plain ones with respect to all indicators except for the zero-trade 
(Appendix 2, Table a2.3). On ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, simple non-financial bonds are almost 
always less liquid than complex coupon bonds. Complexity and liquidity may be related because of 
investors’ risk perception; on the one hand, uncertainty and (unanticipated) adverse shocks may 
affect complex products more heavily than plain ones; on the other hand, expectations of new 
economic and financial conditions call for hedging strategies to face incoming risks (since it may 
change the probability structure adopted to weight future states of the world.   
In summary, while higher MTS is on average related to higher liquidity irrespective of the trading 
venues, other bond features such as issuer’s industry sector and coupon complexity may impact 
differently on liquidity depending on the trading venues. This may well be related to differences in 
the microstructure of the trading venues. In this respect, and with specific reference to ExtraMOT 
and EuroTLX, two elements need to be taken into account: first, EuroTLX rule stating that at least 
one liquidity provider must be present for each listed financial instrument; second, the stricter 
 
29  When comparing the values of each liquidity indicator across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, the liquidity indicators 
perform much better on the latter for both bank and non-financial bonds, independently of nationality (again, this is in 
line with the evidence commented with respect to the whole sample; results available upon request to the authors). 
30  We performed also a t-test comparing the values of each liquidity indicator across the two venues (results available 
upon request). Italian bank bonds are more liquid on DomesticMOT when considering the Amihud and turnover ratio 
statistics, while Italian non-financial bonds are always more liquid on DomesticMOT except for the Roll indicator 
(which points to the same level of liquidity). Foreign bank bonds are characterized by similar values of zero-trade days 
and turnover ratio across venues, while price resiliency and round trip costs seem to be lower on EuroTLX.  
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requirements envisaged for the compliance to liquidity provider’s obligations envisaged by 
EuroTLX relative to ExtraMOT (and DomesticMOT as well) 31. 
 
 
The evidence discussed so far is confirmed by the result of the principal component analysis (PCA), 
combining the four liquidity indicators (mk) into an aggregate (il)liquidity index (AII). 
As expected, for all the trading venues, the AII achieves its peak during the sovereign debt crisis 
(from July 2011 to January 2012). However, liquidity deterioration of both bank and non-financial 
bonds has been more severe for bond traded on both ExtraMOT and EuroTLX than for bonds 
fragmented across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX (Figure 8).  
Finally, we check how the four liquidity indicators contribute to AII by ranking the factor loadings 
of the first principal component:  
 
AII = % w'
(
')
∗ m'  
 
where wk are the factor loadings for the principal components. High factor loadings imply great 
importance of the corresponding indicators as a liquidity driver in each trading venue.  
 
 
31  Regarding microstructural issues, it might be observed that, in general, a market operator has to strike a balance 
between the goal of attracting as many traders as possible (improving liquidity to maximize turnover and its revenues) 
and the cost of providing the level of liquidity associated with its expected profit. Therefore, a relatively new market 
entrant (such as EuroTLX) might have chosen to apply a more stringent (although slightly more expensive) liquidity 
requirements set in order to challenge the market share of the incumbent market operator. 
Figure 8 – Aggregate illiquidity indicators stemming from principal component analysis  
 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX  
 
 
ExtraMOT and EuroTLX  
 
 
Note: the figure reports the normalized absolute value of the factor loading obtained by estimating the first principal component of 
four liquidity measures (percentage of days with zero-trade, price impact, turnover ratio and Roll indicator of bid-ask spread). 
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As shown in Figure 9, the contribution of the four liquidity indicators to the AII is quite 
homogeneous across trading venues and across industries. Therefore, there is no evidence of a 
dominant single indicator acting as the key liquidity driver. Over the sample period, summarizing 
liquidity conditions of dual-listed bonds by a single indicator would thus be misleading; however, at 
some point in time, some liquidity dimensions may play a slightly more relevant role.32  
 
5 The determinants of trading across venues: empirical evidence for the Italian 
dual-listed corporate bonds  
This Section discusses the results of the econometric analysis regarding the determinants of trading 
occurrence (defined as the probability of trading) for the 409 bonds in our sample. This approach 
builds on the evidence highlighted in the previous Sections that infrequent trading is a key feature 
of Italian corporate bonds.33 Since all four liquidity indicators are informative about the liquidity of 
dual-listed bonds, we specified alternative models using some liquidity measures as dependent 
 
32  As for bonds traded across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, liquidity is evenly driven by the four liquidity indicators on 
ExtraMOT, while on EuroTLX the Amihud and Roll indicators tend to be slightly more relevant. The contribution of 
the four indicators to the AII is quite homogeneous also for bonds traded across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, although 
for bank bonds on EuroTLX the Roll indicator appears to contribute less to liquidity, while on DomesticMOT the 
Amihud ratio contributes slightly more to the liquidity of non-financial bonds. 
33  The only exception is given by non-financial bonds traded simultaneously on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX. 
Figure 9 – Weights of liquidity indicators estimated by applying principal component analysis 
 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX  
 
 
ExtraMOT and EuroTLX  
 
 
Note: the figure reports the normalized absolute value of the factor loading obtained by estimating the first principal component of 
the selected liquidity indicators (depth, frequency of trades, price resiliency and roundtrip costs). 
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variables. Results34 are qualitatively similar to those stemming from the trade occurrence model (we 
just report the evidence referring to trade occurrence though). 
We thus test whether, and to what extent, a set of bond attributes and other variables impact 
differently on the probability of trade occurrence depending on the trading venue. Before going 
through the empirical evidence, we report a brief survey of the literature, which inspired us in the 
variables selection process. 
 
5.1 The determinants of corporate bond liquidity: a survey of the literature 
The empirical analysis of bond liquidity on secondary markets has ascertained the role of bond 
characteristics, issuer attributes, and market conditions. Although most of the studies focused on the 
US markets, a bunch of contributions analysed data on euro-denominated bonds (Annaert and De 
Ceuster, 1999; McGinty, 2001; Dìaz and Navarro, 2002; Houweling et al., 2005; Petrella and Resti, 
2013). 
Among the bond features, issue size is found to affect liquidity positively (Alexander et al., 2000; 
Hong and Warga, 2000; Hotchkiss and Jostova, 2007; Petrella and Resti, 2013). This result is 
consistent with the market microstructure inventory models (transaction costs associated with large 
issues are low because dealers may easily manage their inventory costs). Another rationalization 
hinges on the low-information-costs argument (large issues have less information costs, since more 
information is disseminated among investors and more investors own and analyze them). In 
addition, smaller issues are more easily absorbed by buy-and-hold investors who reduce trading 
and, hence, liquidity (see Houweling et al., 2005, for references on these views). However, some 
contrarian evidence is provided by McGinty (2001) who finds that the issued amount has a negative 
impact on liquidity. 
Residual maturity has a positive impact on liquidity. Bonds tend to trade actively in the period 
immediately after the issuance, while liquidity drops after a few months, either because bonds tend 
to be seized in buy-and-hold portfolios (Sarig and Warga, 1989) or because managers are 
committed to make market prevalently in newly issued bonds (McGinty, 2001). Therefore trading 
volume decreases as residual maturity declines (Alexander et al., 2000; Hotchkiss and Jostova, 
2007; Petrella and Resti, 2013); in addition, evidence shows that short residual maturity causes the 
bid-ask spread to increase (Warga, 1992; Hong and Warga, 2000; Houweling et al., 2005).35 
There is an inverse correlation between rating and turnover (the worse the rating, the higher the 
turnover), thus reflecting a speculative component of trading. Moreover, securities with high ex ante 
credit risk are more subject to speculation because of likely future downgrades, which, in turn, 
intensifies trading (Alexander et al., 2000; Hotchkiss and Jostova, 2007; Petrella and Resti, 2013).  
Also interest rate risk (either duration or, sometimes, time-to-maturity itself) may affect liquidity. 
However, the evidence is not conclusive on this point.36 For instance, Alexander et al. (2000) find 
weak evidence of a positive effect on volume; while, Petrella and Resti (2013) find a strong 
 
34 Available upon request. 
35  When the sample analyzed does not include newly issued bonds, some researchers define a threshold to mark old 
and young bonds: Alexander et al. (2000) used two years; Elton et al. (2002), Houweling et al., 2005 and Petrella and 
Resti (2013) one year; Ericson and Renault (2001) three months. 
36  The interest rate risk is also captured the Fama-French slope factor, defined as the difference between the long term 
Treasury bond return and the one month Treasury rate at the end of the previous period (Houweling et al., 2005). 
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significant relationship. Hotchkiss and Jostova (2007) point out mixed results, depending on the 
rating and the coupon structure.37 
Yield dispersion (so called information risk), a measure of market participants’ agreement on the 
value of a bond, is a further factor that induces speculative trading thus affecting liquidity 
(Houweling et al., 2005; Hotchkiss and Jostova, 2007; Alexander et al., 2000). 
Among the issuers’ attributes, empirical studies have also considered whether companies have 
publicly traded equity. Under the hypothesis that private firms convey less information to the 
market, the consequent adverse selection costs should negatively affect the liquidity of their debt. 
However, the evidence is not clear-cut, being either weak (Fenn, 2000) or in contrast with this 
hypothesis (Alexander et al., 2000). Issuer’s industry may also be relevant, since it reflects both 
structural differences in industry regulation and (or) market trends. 
Several authors investigate the correlation between bond and equity markets. Common factors such 
as firm specific news are expected to drive joint reactions of returns and volumes of bonds and 
stocks (Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002; Hotchkiss and Jostova, 2007). De Jong and Driessen (2006) 
show that the liquidity of non-financial bond is related to the liquidity of government bonds. 
Market conditions affects assets’ liquidity that may change over time, especially during stress times. 
Estimate a market liquidity model represents a conventional way to capture the sensitivity of a 
given security to aggregate market liquidity conditions. It allows to distinguish the so-called 
systematic liquidity risk
38
 from the idiosyncratic one. The impact of market stress on bonds’ 
liquidity has also been estimated by taking into account the impact of global risk aversion, usually 
proxied by the so-called quality spread, i.e. the spread between BBB and AAA non-financial 
bonds’ returns (Petrella and Resti, 2013). The reaction to financial stress of low and high-yield 
bonds may differ since yields on BBB-rated issues tend to rise much more than AAA-rated ones, 
widening the gap between them. Another proxy of market stress conditions is the spread between 
the rate at which banks can access central bank funding and a risk-free rate (i.e. the Ted spread for 
the US market or the Euribor-OIS spread for the European markets). 
 
5.2 The model specification  
In order to investigate the determinants of trade occurrence, we estimate a random effect panel logit 
model39 regressing the probability of trading for each bond on each venue: 
 +,-.(/,012,3,4) = +,-.(5 + 783 +  93 > 0) 
 
where /,012,4,3 is a dummy variable equal to one if bond i is traded on venue j in day t and zero 
otherwise. Although this work considers three trading venues overall (DomesticMOT, EuroTLX 
and ExtraMOT), four regressions are run since bonds listed DomesticMOT and ExtraMOT are also 
traded on EuroTLX. Independent variables are stacked in matrix 83; α and β represent the 
parameters to be estimated. Finally, the cumulative distribution function of the error 9 is logistic: 
<(9) = [1 + 2?]. 
 
37  The coupon structure matters as long as callability modifies duration. The call option acts as an implied insurance by 
protecting the issuer from adverse interest rates changes ad is found to reduce trading volume.  
38 Some authors refer to it also as commonality, or synchronicity, in liquidity (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka 2008; Acharya 
and Pedersen, 2005; Brockman and Chung, 2008; Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk 2012). 
39  The panel probit model is ruled out since it does not guarantee convergence of the estimation algorithm; in 
particular, such an outcome occurs with the ExtraMOT sample. Fixed effect panel logit is ruled out since it rises 
incidental parameter issues. 
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The regressors (83) can be grouped into the following categories: bond features, issuer attributes, 
and market conditions. Bond features are i) issue size, ii) complexity (either as plain-vanilla or 
structured), iii) time-to-maturity (either in years or as a ratio to the total life of the product), and the 
iv) minimum trading size (a proxy to distinguish between retail and non-retail securities).40 As for 
time-to-maturity, both a linear and a quadratic term has been tested.41 In our sample, size and 
complexity are highly correlated, so that they are not included in the same regression model. 
Nationality and industry represent the issuers’ attributes. Since such variables exhibit a strong cross-
correlation with the issue size, they enter the model specification separately from the issue size. Our 
model specification includes the issuer’s credit risk proxied by three indicators: the issuer rating 
released by Moody’s42, the probability of default (expected default frequency or EDF43) and the 
issuer’s credit default swap (CDS) quotation. The official rating is updated whenever a change 
occurs. CDS quotations add a measure of credit risk since they capture the linkage between bond 
and CDS markets. The expected sign of the credit risk effect is ambiguous. Generally speaking, if 
the volume (and the probability of trade occurrence) increases as the bond ex ante risk rises then the 
impact should be positive. Ambiguity is higher for CDS: if an issuer is actively used as underlying 
for CDS, bond liquidity of the same issuer may increase especially during financial crises and for 
investment grade securities, preventing investors from fire sales (Massa and Zhang, 2012). 
As for market conditions, we included the stock market volatility, the information risk (proxied by 
bond daily closing price variability), the Italian sovereign CDS quotations, and a financial crisis 
indicator. Sovereign CDS quotation, stock market volatility and the issuer’s CDS quotations enter 
alternative model specifications to avoid multicollinearity, given that they are highly correlated. 
The crisis indicator is defined using a data driven approach. The beginning and the end of the 
financial crisis are identified through a market dependent periodization, i.e. looking at the pattern of 
a financial stress index (Galliani et al., 2013). Our stress index is the quality spread, i.e. the risk-
premium computed as the difference between the yields of AAA and BBB European non-financial 
bonds. We thus define a “crisis” dummy variable which is equal to one when the index exceeds the 
third quartile of its sample distribution.44 The crisis spans from July 2011 to July 2012. We also 
consider the interaction between the dummy and a set of explicative variables in order to test 
whether their impact on liquidity changes during financial turmoil (5 ⋅ 1BCCDEFGG ⋅ 83 + 783). 
 
5.3 The estimation results 
Evidence from DomesticMOT and EuroTLX 
The probability of trading occurrence across the two trading venues (DomesticMOT and EuroTLX) 
is affected by a set of variables (Table 3; see also Appendix 3 for alternative model specifications). 
Bank bonds are estimated to trade less frequently than non-financial bonds. Bonds issued by Italian 
companies are traded more frequently than foreign ones. As expected, bonds with long residual 
 
40  As mentioned above, this variable shows enough variability only for bonds traded on EuroTLX and ExtraMOT.  
41  As an alternative to time to maturity, we used also the bond age (i.e. time since launch). 
42 We map the Moody’s rating scale with an increasing integer number, as it is frequently reported in the literature. We 
used the issuer ratings provided that all the securities in our data set are represented by senior unsecured bonds. In one 
case, the Moody’s rating was not available and we used the S&P rating. 
43 As measured by Moody’s KMV. Default is defined as failure to make scheduled principal or interest payments. 
According to the Moody’s EDF model, a firm defaults when the market value of its assets (the value of the ongoing 
business) falls below its liabilities payable (the default point). EDF exhibits higher variability than the official rating 
because it considers the issuers’ specific features such as capital structure, market value, and the volatility of its assets. 
44  Source: JP Morgan Maggie European credit risk index, daily data. 
19 
 
maturity are traded frequently (negative age coefficient); while, bond price variability (information 
risk) lowers the probability of trade occurrence on both DomesticMOT and EuroTLX. 
With regard to the statistically significant factors having a different impact on liquidity depending 
on the trading venue. Complex bonds are traded less frequently on DomesticMOT, while the 
opposite holds on EuroTLX. The increase of the issuer’s credit default swap prices (Issuer Cds 
quotations) enhances liquidity only on DomesticMOT. Moreover, trade occurrence appears to be 
negatively influenced by rating announcements only on DomesticMOT. Among the variables 
capturing the correlation between equity and bond markets, the evidence is mixed depending on the 
trading venue since stock market volatility has a negative impact on liquidity on DomesticMOT 
only. Changes in the sovereign CDS quotations reduces liquidity on EuroTLX. 
  
Table 3 – Determinants of trade occurrence on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX 
 
Table 4 compares the impact of the financial market crises on the probability of trading on 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX (Appendix 3 for further details). As expected the dummy crisis has a 
negative sign because the probability of trading has diminished on both venues during the financial 
turmoil. In particular, the dummy crisis amplifies the impact of some explanatory variables, not 
always in both venues though. Italian bank bonds suffer from the deterioration of market conditions 
on EuroTLX only. Conversely, rating changes are estimated to have a higher impact during crisis 
times on DomesticMOT only. 
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Table 4 – Impact of sovereign debt crisis on trade occurrence on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX 
 
Evidence from ExtraMOT and EuroTLX 
The econometric analysis performed on the subsample of bonds fragmented across ExtraMOT and 
EuroTLX suggests that the explanatory variables broadly exhibit the same impact on trade 
occurrence, with the exceptions of residual maturity, issuer industry and credit risk. In particular, on 
ExtraMOT the probability of trading seasoned bonds increases; while, the opposite holds on 
EuroTLX; the issuer industry is relevant on EuroTLX only (bank bonds traded less frequently than 
non-financial bonds). Rating announcements affect trade occurrence on EuroTLX (Table 5, 
Appendix 3 for more details). 
 
Table 5 – Determinants of trade occurrence on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX 
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The interaction between the dummy crisis and bonds’ attributes highlights that only few attributes 
have an impact on the probability of trade occurrence (variable across venues). In particular, in bad 
market conditions the probability of trading bank bonds decreases on EuroTLX. Similarly, market 
turbulence significantly reduces the probability of retail bonds trading on EuroTLX. But, on 
ExtraMOT both Italian bonds and complex bonds experience a more frequent trading (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 – Impact of sovereign debt crisis on trade occurrence on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX 
  
 
5.4 The marginal effects 
The magnitude of explanatory variables’ impact on trade occurrence is quantified by estimating the 
average marginal effects of each significant variable on the probability of trade across 
DomesticMOT, EuroTLX and ExtraMOT. The analysis is also interesting since it allows us to 
gauge the extent to which the crisis magnified the effect of the significant variables (Appendix 3).  
Some bonds’ attributes, such as complexity and MTS, and some issuer’s attributes, such as industry 
and nationality, exert a relevant effect on the probability of trading. 
Indeed, for bonds traded across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX the probability of trading for bank 
bonds decreases on average by -0.5 on EuroTLX. Regarding issuer’s nationality, the most relevant 
impact on the probability of trade occurrence is found for Italian bonds traded on EuroTLX (+0.4 
for bonds traded jointly on DomesticMOT and +0.5 for bonds traded jointly on ExtraMOT). As 
observed above, structured bonds tend to be more frequently traded on EuroTLX, while the reverse 
is true on DomesticMOT. Indeed, the probability of trade occurrence for structured bonds increases 
by 0.4 on EuroTLX, while it decreases by 0.2 on DomesticMOT. If MTS is 1,000 euro (retail), the 
probability of trade occurrence increases by 0.1 on ExtraMOT and by 0.5 on EuroTLX.45 
Lastly, we measured the impact of the sovereign debt crisis (Appendix 3). Results are in line with 
the empirical evidence reported so far. As for bonds traded on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX, the 
crisis affects the explanatory variables in a different way across the two venues. On DomesticMOT, 
 
45  Less relevant, instead, are the quantitative impacts of issuer Cds quotations, information risk and Italian stock 
market volatility. 
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during the sovereign debt crisis the impact of the issuer CDS quotations reversed (i.e. became 
negative); whereas the negative marginal effects of rating and information risk widened. On 
EuroTLX, instead, the outburst of the debt crisis lowers the probability of trading of Italian bank 
bonds (while trading of non-financial bonds remains unaffected); whereas, time to maturity loses 
statistical relevance with respect to tranquil periods, it keeps showing a negative sign though.  
As for bonds dual-listed on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX, the sovereign debt crisis tends to raise the 
probability of trade occurrence of Italian retail structured bonds traded on ExtraMOT; whilst on 
EuroTLX financial market turbulence affects mainly the probability of trading of seasoned bonds 
(bonds with a lower time to maturity trade more during bad times). 
 
6 The impact of fragmentation on liquidity: evidence from a matched sample of 
bank bonds 
This Section compares the liquidity level of bank bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and 
EuroTLX with otherwise similar bank bonds traded only on DomesticMOT. In order to carry out 
such a comparison, we resorted to the matched sample approach, given that no counterfactual 
evidence is available for fragmented bonds, i.e. it is not possible to observe their liquidity level if 
they were not traded on multiple venues. Matched sample techniques are frequently employed in 
the finance literature, especially in market microstructure studies. Such methods, in fact, allow 
comparing the execution costs on different exchanges, or across various groups of securities. For 
instance, Davies and Kim (2009) consider two groups of stocks that differ in their listing status and 
match them in pairs according to various characteristics. We focus on bank bonds because the 
sample size of non-financial bonds traded on DomesticMOT only is not suitable for the matching 
exercise. Indeed, during the sample period, there are 705 non-fragmented bank bonds (792 
securities minus 87 fragmented bonds); whereas, the number of non-financial bonds traded on 
DomesticMOT only is 5 (out of 18; see Table 1). Similarly, we rule out bonds jointly traded on 
ExtraMOT and EuroTLX because the majority of the securities traded on ExtraMOT are dual-listed 
(more precisely, 104 out of 109 bank bonds, and 205 out of 216 non-financial bonds; see Table 1 ). 
Finally, we do not focus on EuroTLX alone because we aim at comparing the liquidity conditions 
of dual-listed and non-fragmented bonds on a regulated market (i.e. DomesticMOT) rather than on 
an Mtf (i.e. EuroTLX), given the relevance of this topic on policy grounds.  
Therefore, we apply the matching sample approach to 705 bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT 
only from January 2010 until June 2013 in order to draw a matched sample with 87 securities 
jointly traded on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX. The non-fragmented securities account for about 
90% of all outstanding bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT both in terms of total number of 
securities and of average market value, while fragmented bonds correspond to 10% of the total 
number of securities and to 54% of the average total market value.46 
Matching relies on a nearest-neighbor approach, minimizing the difference (matching error) 
between the two groups of bank bonds with respect to a set of criteria. Such criteria refer to both 
securities’ and issuers’ attributes. As for securities attributes, we considered the market value47, the 
complexity (plain vanilla versus structured bond), time-to-maturity and MTS. As for the issuers’ 
attributes, we take into account nationality (Italian versus foreigner) and rating. The matching 
 
46 The average market value is computed over January 2010-June 2013 considering market price and issue size. 
47  Matching is based on the average bond market value (the product between the amount issued and the market price) 
over the span January 2010-June 2013. Market value is preferred to the issue size as a matching criterion in order to 
select bonds that might be deemed similar also with respect to the market price trend. The choice of the market value is 
also in line with Davies and Kim (2008), who matched stocks by their market capitalization and their market price.  
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sample is thus constructed by minimizing the matching errors (i.e. the absolute distance) between 
matching pairs with respect to the characteristics mentioned above.48 The matched pairs are 
reported in Appendix 4. 
In order to assess the impact of fragmentation on liquidity levels, we compare the averages over the 
sample period of the four liquidity indicators for the dual-listed bonds with those computed for the 
non-fragmented securities. As a robustness check, we perform both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test 
(see Appendix 4, Table a4.2 for details). Moreover, given the evidence reported in Section 4 
showing that Italian bonds traded on DomesticMOT are more liquid than foreign ones along all the 
liquidity dimensions but the turnover ratio, we also report evidence for the subsample of Italian 
bank bonds (40 securities), in order to check whether they behave differently.  
The analysis shows that liquidity of non-fragmented securities is higher than that of dual-listed 
bonds for three out of four indicators (i.e. zero-trade, turnover ratio and price impact); whereas, the 
differences in the Roll indicator are not statistically significant. However, this evidence does not 
hold for the subsample of the Italian banks bonds: the liquidity of dual-listed securities (zero-trade, 
price impact, and Roll) is higher than that of non-fragmented bonds (the difference is not 
statistically significant for the turnover ratio).49 The discrepancies between the whole sample and 
the Italian sub-sample is due to the foreign securities, which on average are characterized by a 
lower market value and issue size50 and are less liquid if fragmented. 
As a robustness check, we estimate a multivariate model regressing the differences in the liquidity 
levels (computed for the dual-listed and the non-fragmented bonds) on the differences in the factors 
exploited to draw the matching sample (market value, time-to-maturity, and rating).51 Such check is 
equivalent to test whether the assumption of perfectly homogenous securities holds or, in other 
words, whether discrepancies in the liquidity conditions across the two sample of securities are 
related to differences in their attributes or to the features of the trading venues. Results show that 
any of the variables used to draw the matching sample is jointly significant (at 5% confidence 
level), neither for the whole sample nor for the Italian bank bonds sub-sample. Empirical evidence 
thus seems to support the hypothesis of homogeneity of non-fragmented matched securities and 
dual-listed bonds. 
 
7 Concluding remarks  
This paper investigates the liquidity conditions and the determinants of trading for a sample of non-
government bonds fragmented across the main Italian retail bond markets (DomesticMOT, 
ExtraMOT, and EuroTLX) from January 2010 to June 2013. In order to account for different 
 
48  Only two out of the six characteristics used to match pairs are computed as averages (i.e. market value and rating 
score). Therefore we could not apply a statistical test to evaluate the significance of the absolute distance between each 
pair of bonds. Then, we decided to use several attributes besides market value and rating, after checking that if we had 
relied only on market value and rating scores, it would have led to a very different selection of pairs of bonds in terms 
of maturity, with a significant impact on the  liquidity analysis.  
49  This result is confirmed both by the t-test and the Wilcoxon test. 
50  During the sample period, Italian bank bonds have an average market value of 262 million euros (versus 266 of the 
non-fragmented); while, figures of foreign securities amount to 144 and 146 million euros respectively. Similarly, the 
fragmented Italian bank bond have an average issue size of 260 million euros (versus 247 for the non-fragmented); 
while, the corresponding figures for foreign securities amount to 141 and 95 million euros, respectively. 
51  In multivariate regressions several dependent variables are jointly regressed on the same independent variables. 
Individual coefficients and standard errors are identical to those obtained by estimating each equation separately, but the 
coefficients’ significance can be jointly tested across equations because between-equation covariances are estimated. 
The multivariate regression is also supported by the Breusch–Pagan test, since the residuals of the explanatory variables 
turn out to be not independent of each other. 
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dimensions of liquidity, four measures are considered: zero-trade, turnover ratio, Amihud statistics 
and Roll indicator. Evidence from the principal component analysis supports the use of all these 
indicators since they equally contributed to the liquidity conditions of dual-listed bonds over the 
entire sample period. Indicators are computed separately for bank bonds and non-financial bonds in 
order to address eventual differences in trading activity due the issuer’s industry. Also the impact of 
the sovereign debt crisis on liquidity levels has been assessed. Focusing on liquidity of fragmented 
bonds traded across different venues allows us to test whether, in spite of fragmentation, Italian 
corporate bond markets may be regarded as integrated and competitive; hence, our approach is 
helpful to examine the effects following the abolition of the so-called concentration rule pursued by 
the MiFID. This is a very relevant topic on policy grounds and it has been tackled by the Italian 
legislator extending pre- and post-trade transparency rules to non-equity markets, in spite of the fact 
that the Directive envisaged such requirement for equity markets only.  
Overall, the evidence is not clear-cut since the empirical findings depend upon a variety of factors: 
the liquidity indicator, the issuer’s sector, and on the trading venue. Although the Amihud price-
impact statistics and the Rolls spread suggest EuroTLX being more liquid, liquidity levels appear 
similar across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX. But, EuroTLX turns out to be more liquid than 
ExtraMOT. Moreover, bank bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX tend to be less 
liquid than non-financial securities and seem to have suffered more, in terms of lower liquidity, 
during the sovereign debt crisis. Whereas, bank bonds fragmented across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX 
are more liquid than bonds issued by non-financial companies.   
Both the univariate and the multivariate analysis highlighted that bonds’ characteristics and market 
turbulences may impact differently on liquidity depending on the trading venue, thus pointing to the 
role of microstructural features, such as the presence of liquidity providers and the information 
released on the liquidity conditions of the financial instruments.  
Finally, the paper sheds light on the effect of fragmentation by comparing liquidity levels of bank 
bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and EuroTLX with otherwise similar bank bonds traded 
only on DomesticMOT. The impact of fragmentation seems to depend on bond attributes, being the 
issue size a key driver of liquidity. Actually, depending on the liquidity indicator, Italian bank 
bonds -whose issued amount is higher than that of foreign bonds- do not seem to be negatively 
affected by fragmentation, whereas foreigner bonds are less liquid if dual-listed.  
This study adds to the existing literature by providing new empirical evidence on the liquidity of 
Italian non-government bonds. To our knowledge, this is the first work to explore the impact of 
fragmentation on the liquidity of non-government bonds. Our findings are consistent with the idea 
that transparency rules and market rules promoting liquidity provisions may contribute to the 
development of an integrated secondary bond market. To this respect, this work is also relevant on 
policy grounds, especially within the current European regulatory framework, which has recently 
undergone a change towards a greater transparency in non-equity markets. 
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Appendix 1 
Sample selection: some methodological issues 
One of the key issues about the analysis regards the classification of bonds in terms of the 
issuer’s industry, the country of issue, the coupon structure, etc... 
As for the issuer’s industry classification, we faced two options: either an institutional (and 
formal) approach or a substantial one. We opted for an intermediate solution which is also followed 
by Borsa Italiana, since i) it offers a simple and practical distinction between the financial and the 
non-financial sector (including almost only bank issuers in the former group and aggregates all 
other industries, with the residual exception of insurance, in the latter); ii) although simplified, such 
an approach is satisfactory, effective, and realistic for our purposes as long as it is used by 
intermediaries when offering bonds to retail investors (whose concern is particularly relevant to us); 
furthermore, iii) on the one hand, official classifications (such as the UIC one) are too rigorous and 
formal, resulting in an unnecessary generic attribution to macro-sectors (e.g. financial or non-
financial companies); iv) on the other hand, classifications suggested by info providers (such as 
Reuters or Bloomberg) might be too industry-specific
1
, and go beyond the scope of this study. The 
choice between a formal versus a substantial approach affects both descriptive statistics and 
subsequent analysis, also because it has to be considered the common practice followed by large 
companies to optimize their financial operations performing the issuance activity through a 
dedicated financial vehicle company (e.g.: Telecom XY Finance on behalf of Telecom XY)
2
. 
However, while reviewing Borsa Italiana’s industry attribution for each bond both in the 
market and in the sample list, we have corrected some patently wrong attributions (typically, a bank 
issuer classified as ‘corporate’, meaning ‘non-financial’, or vice-versa). Such corrections may have 
in turn accounted for further discrepancies with aggregate official market data on turnover
3
, and 
obviously influenced our subsequent analysis and conclusions, which deeply rely upon the key 
distinction between banking and corporate issuers. 
A further source of uncertainty is related to the information concerning the issuer’s 
nationality and the country of issue. Again, we prefer substance over form, using the (ultimate) 
parent company’s country (of incorporation) rather than the vehicle’s country. In some cases we 
have adopted Reuters’s classification, finding it more detailed and complete than that provided by 
Borsa Italiana. 
As far as bonds coupon structure is concerned, there are lots of options available from 
Reuters or Bloomberg (we ruled out the Borsa Italiana’s data for sake of parsimony). However, we 
followed the approach previously adopted by Grasso, Linciano, Pierantoni, and Siciliano (2010), i.e. 
we basically distinguish between ‘simple’ and ‘structured’ bonds. The ‘simple’ class is composed 
by fixed and floating rate coupon bonds (this class includes also zero coupon bonds); while, the 
‘structured’ group is more heterogeneous since it includes index linked, equity linked, step up, step 
down bonds, and, more generally, bonds with a derivative component. 
 
 
1 In some cases they also might disagree on the ultimate financial or non-financial nature of the issuer. 
2 For instance, a formal classification would consider these financial companies as part of the financial sector, along 
with banks and other monetary or credit institutions, whereas we believe that they represent a part of the telecom sector 
issuance activity and should be classified accordingly.  
3 We find few ambiguous cases (of little significance in terms of turnover). 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
Table a2.1 - Liquidity of bonds fragmented across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX by lot size  
(percentage values)  
 
 Indicator MTS<=1000
1
  MTS>1000
1
  
Test 
significance  
Results 
ExtraMOT 
 bank Amihud 47.3 16.3 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Roll 62.2 57.1  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 0.0 0.2 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Zero-trade 72.0 71.7  Same liquidity levels 
 non-financial Amihud 51.2 5.7 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Roll 64.4 56.8  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 0.1 0.2 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Zero-trade 73.4 76.5 (*) Smaller lot size more liquid 
EuroTLX 
 bank Amihud 17.4 5.5 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Roll 38.8 42.4  Same liquidity level 
  Turnover 0.3 0.8 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Zero-trade 40.2 45.9 (*) Smaller lot size more liquid 
 non–financial Amihud 16.4 1.2 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Roll 35.3 53.1 (*) Smaller lot size more liquid 
  Turnover 0.2 0.4 (*) Greater lot size more liquid 
  Zero-trade 45.7 45.3  Same liquidity levels 
 
Source: our elaborations on Consob database. 
1
 MTS= Minimun trading size. Sample average of the liquidity 
indicators computed on monthly data in percentage values. (*) = Null hypothesis rejected at 95% confidence level. 
Higher values for Amihud, Roll, zero-trade indicators mean lower liquidity levels. All bonds fragmented across 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX have a lot size lower than or equal to 1,000 euros and therefore are not eligible for 
the analysis herein reported. 
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Table a2.2 - Dual-listed bond liquidity by issuer’s nationality 
(percentage values)  
 
 Indicator Italian
1
  Foreign
1
  
Test 
significance  
Inference  
DomesticMOT 
 bank Amihud 9.1 63.0 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Roll 37.3 67.0 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Turnover 1.8 2.0  Same liquidity levels 
  Zero-trade 24.4 42.1 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
EuroTLX (bonds also traded on DomesticMOT) 
 bank Amihud 20.2 22.7  Same liquidity levels 
  Roll 51.9 45.4  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 1.0 2.1 (*) Foreign bonds more liquid  
  Zero-trade 36.7 39.4  Same liquidity levels 
ExtraMOT 
 bank Amihud 9.8 29.7 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Roll 57.8 64.2  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 0.3 0.0 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Zero-trade 60.3 82.5 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
 non–financial Amihud 14.2 55.3 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Roll 59.1 67.6  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 0.3 0.0 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Zero-trade 55.7 83.6 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
EuroTLX (bonds also traded on ExtraMOT) 
 bank Amihud 2.4 15.2 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Roll 37.9 48.6  Italian bonds more liquid 
  Turnover 1.3 0.1 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Zero-trade 24.8 63.3 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
 non–financial Amihud 3.4 17.7 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Roll 45.9 37.7  Foreign bonds more liquid 
  Turnover 0.7 0.1 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
  Zero-trade 27.8 59.7 (*) Italian bonds more liquid  
 
Source: our elaborations on Consob database. 
1 
Sample average of the liquidity indicators computed on monthly 
data and in percentage values. (*) = Null hypothesis rejected at 95% confidence level. Higher values for Amihud, 
Roll, zero-trade indicators mean lower liquidity levels. All non-financial bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT 
and EuroTLX are Italian and therefore are not eligible for the analysis herein reported. 
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Table a2.3 - Liquidity by coupon structure of bank bonds fragmented across DomesticMOT and 
EuroTLX and of non-financial bonds fragmented across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX 
(percentage values)  
 
 Indicator Plain vanilla
1
  Structured
1
  Test result  Basic inference  
DomesticMOT 
 bank Amihud 60.2 27.8 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Roll 54.9 51.5  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 4.7 1.5 (*) Plain bonds more liquid 
  Zero-trade 14.8 42.5 (*) Plain bonds more liquid 
EuroTLX (bonds also traded on DomesticMOT) 
 bank Amihud 29.4 18.5 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Roll 60.6 40.2 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Turnover 0.6 2.0 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Zero-trade 44.9 36.6  Same liquidity levels 
ExtraMOT 
 non–financial Amihud 34.2 12.1 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Roll 63.4 61.9  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 0.1 0.3 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Zero-trade 75.7 62.1 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
EuroTLX (bonds also traded on ExtraMOT) 
 non–financial Amihud 11.4 6.4 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Roll 41.7 36.1  Same liquidity levels 
  Turnover 0.3 0.6 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
  Zero-trade 50.7 34.5 (*) Structured bonds more liquid 
 
Source: our elaborations on Consob database. 1Sample average of the liquidity indicators computed on monthly 
data and in percentage values. (*) = Null hypothesis rejected at 95% confidence level. Higher values for Amihud, 
Roll, Zero-trade indicators mean lower liquidity levels. Both non-financial bonds fragmented across 
DomesticMOT and EuroTLX and bank bonds fragmented across ExtraMOT and EuroTLX are plain vanilla and 
therefore are not eligible for the analysis herein reported. 
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Appendix 3 - Estimation results  
 
Table a3.1 - Determinants of trade occurrence on DomesticMOT and EuroTLX  
 
Explicative variables DomesticMOT  
Model (1) 
EuroTLX  
Model (1) 
DomesticMOT 
Model (2) 
EuroTLX 
Model (2) 
Bank 
-3.9*** 
(1.0) 
-5.6*** 
(1.1) 
-5.0*** 
(1.0) 
-7.3*** 
(1.2) 
Bank*crisis 
0.1 
(0.2) 
-0.6*** 
(0.2) 
0.1 
(0.2) 
-0.6*** 
(0.2) 
Nationality 
2.0*** 
(0.4) 
2.9*** 
(0.6) 
- - 
Nationality*crisis 
0.1 
(0.1) 
-0.3*** 
(0.1) 
- - 
Nationality*Italian sovereign Cds - - 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
Complexity 
-1.4** 
(0.6) 
3.0*** 
(0.8) 
-1.5** 
(0.7) 
2.8*** 
(0.9) 
Complexity*crisis 
0.01 
(0.1) 
0.01 
(0.1) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.1 
(0.1) 
Age 
-0.3*** 
(0.02) 
-0.5*** 
(0.02) 
-0.3*** 
(0.02) 
-0.5*** 
(0.02) 
Age*crisis 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
Issuer Cds 
0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
0.00003 
(0.0004) 
0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0003) 
Issuer Cds*crisis 
-0.003*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.00005 
(0.0004) 
Information risk 
-0.1*** 
(0.03) 
-0.3*** 
(0.05) 
-0.1*** 
(0.04) 
-0.3*** 
(0.05) 
Information risk*crisis 
-0.1 
(0.07) 
-0.3*** 
(0.1) 
-0.1 
(0.07) 
-0.3*** 
(0.1) 
Italian stock market volatility 
-2.4*** 
(0.3) 
0.3 
(0.4) 
-2.4*** 
(0.3) 
0.5 
(0.4) 
Italian stock market volatility*crisis 
0.5 
(0.4) 
0.4 
(0.5) 
0.5 
(0.4) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
Constant 
6.7*** 
(0.9) 
4.0*** 
(1.0) 
8.9*** 
(0.8) 
7.2*** 
(0.9) 
Number of observations 883 883 883 883 
Number of bonds 100 100 100 100 
ρ 0.5*** 0.7*** 0.6*** 0.7*** 
 
Note: “**” indicates significance at the 5% level; “***” indicates significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis standard 
errors are reported. “ρ” is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level component; the significance 
of this parameter is verified by applying a likelihood ratio test which compares the pooled estimator with the panel 
estimator. If “ρ” is significantly different from zero, the use of panel estimation methodology is justified. Nationality is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer of the bond is Italian; Complexity is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
bond is structured; Bank is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond was issued by a bank; Information risk stands for 
bond price volatility; Italian stock market volatility is the volatility of the FTSEMib implied in index stock prices; Crisis 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the risk-premium associated to low grade corporate bonds with respect to prime 
corporate bonds (JP Morgan Maggie European credit risk index) overcomes the III° quartile of its daily distribution. 
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Table a3.2 - Determinants of trade occurrence on ExtraMOT and EuroTLX  
 
Explicative variables ExtraMOT  
Model (1) 
EuroTLX  
Model (1) 
ExtraMOT 
Model (2) 
EuroTLX 
Model (2) 
Bank 
0.02 
(0.2) 
-0.6** 
(0.3) 
0.4 
(0.3) 
-0.2 
(0.4) 
Bank*crisis 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.5*** 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.5*** 
(0.04) 
Nationality 
2.4*** 
(0.2) 
2.9*** 
(0.3) 
- - 
Nationality*crisis 
0.4*** 
(0.04) 
0.0005 
(0.04) 
- - 
Nationality*Italian sovereign Cds - - 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Complexity 
0.7 
(0.5) 
-0.2 
(0.7) 
0.8 
(0.6) 
-0.1 
(0.8) 
Complexity*crisis 
0.2*** 
(0.1) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.2*** 
(0.1) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
Lot size 
1.3*** 
(0.2) 
3.2*** 
(0.3) 
0.5*** 
(0.2) 
2.2*** 
(-0.3) 
Lot size*crisis 
0.2*** 
(0.05) 
-0.2*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.2*** 
(0.04) 
Issue size 
0.5** 
(0.2) 
0.8*** 
(0.3) 
0.4 
(0.3) 
0.7** 
(0.3) 
Issue size*crisis 
0.03*** 
(0.004) 
0.07*** 
(0.004) 
0.04*** 
(0.004) 
0.07*** 
(0.004) 
Age 
0.1*** 
(0.01) 
-0.4*** 
(0.01) 
0.1*** 
(0.01) 
-0.4*** 
(0.01) 
Age*crisis 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.001) 
0.1*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.007) 
Issuer Cds quotations 
0.002*** 
(0.00009) 
0.004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.002*** 
(0.00009) 
0.004*** 
(0.0001) 
Issuer Cds quotations*crisis 
-0.001*** 
(0.00009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
Information risk 
0.4*** 
(0.02) 
0.4*** 
(0.03) 
0.4*** 
(0.02) 
0.4*** 
(0.03) 
Information risk*crisis 
-0.3*** 
(0.03) 
-0.5*** 
(0.03) 
-0.3*** 
(0.03) 
-0.5*** 
(0.03) 
Italian stock market volatility 
-2.3*** 
(0.2) 
-3.7*** 
(0.2) 
-2.3*** 
(-0.2) 
-3.7*** 
(0.2) 
Italian stock market volatility*crisis 
-1.4*** 
(0.3) 
-1.4*** 
(0.3) 
-1.2*** 
(0.3) 
-1.4*** 
(0.3) 
Constant 
-14.7*** 
(4.3) 
-18.5*** 
(6.1) 
-10.1*** 
(5.4) 
-14.0** 
(7.1) 
Number of observations 883 883 883 883 
Number of bonds 309 309 309 309 
ρ 0.4*** 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 
 
Note: “**” indicates significance at the 5% level; “***” indicates significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis standard errors are reported. “ρ” is the 
proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level component; the significance of this parameter is verified by applying a likelihood ratio 
test which compares the pooled estimator with the panel estimator. If “ρ” is significantly different from zero, the use of panel estimation methodology 
is justified. Nationality is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer of the bond is Italian; Complexity is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond 
is structured; Bank is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond was issued by a bank; Lot size  is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bond’s 
lot size is less or equal to 1,000 euro; Information risk stands for bond price volatility; Italian stock market volatility is the volatility of the FTSEMib 
implied in index stock prices; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if the risk-premium associated to low grade corporate bonds with respect to 
prime corporate bonds (JP Morgan Maggie European credit risk index) overcomes the III° quartile of its daily distribution. 
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Table a3.3 - Estimates of marginal effects  
 
Explicative variables Bonds fragmented on DomesticMOT and 
EuroTLX  
Bonds fragmented on ExtraMOT and 
EuroTLX 
 DomesticMOT EuroTLX ExtraMOT EuroTLX 
Tranquil period of time     
 Bank sector -0.3*** -0.5*** - -0.1** 
 Nationality 0.3*** 0.4*** 0.3*** 0.5*** 
 Complexity -0.2*** 0.4*** - - 
 Lot size - - 0.1*** 0.5*** 
 Issue size - - 0.06*** 0.1*** 
 Age -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.01*** -0.07*** 
 
Issuer Cds quotations  
Quotations (b.p.) 
0.0004*** - 0.0002*** 0.001*** 
 Issuer rating -0.01*** - -0.003** 0.04*** 
 EDF(%) - - 0.01*** 0.03*** 
 Information risk (%) -0.0001*** -0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 
 
Italian stock market volatility 
(%) 
-0.004*** - -0.002*** -0.006*** 
Crisis     
 Bank sector -0.3*** -0.6*** - -0.1*** 
 Nationality 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 
 Complexity -0.2*** 0.2*** 0.1* - 
 Lot size - - 0.2*** 0.2*** 
 Issue size - - - 0.1* 
 Age -0.03*** -0.06*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 
 
Issuer Cds quotations 
Quotations (b.p.) 
-0.0003*** - 6.9e-07 0.0002*** 
 Issuer rating -0.02*** - -0.005** 0.04*** 
 EDF(%) - - 0.01*** 0.04*** 
 Information risk(%) -0.0002*** -0.0006*** 0.0002*** 0.0001** 
 
Italian stock market volatility 
(%) 
-0.002*** - -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
Note: Bank sector is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the issuer belongs to the banking sector; 
Nationality is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the issuer is an Italian firm; Complexity is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one when the bond is structured; Lot size is a dummy variable which is equal to one 
when the lot size is less or equal to 1,000 euro; Issue size is the logarithm of the amount outstanding (euro); Age is 
the number of trading days from the issue date; Issuer Cds quotations is expressed in basis points; Issuer rating is 
expressed as a score; EDF is the expected default probability expressed in percentage values; Information risk is 
the bond price volatility expressed in percentage values; Italian stock market volatility is the volatility of the 
FTSEMib implied in index stock prices expressed in percentage values. Crisis is identified when the risk-premium 
associated to low grade corporate bonds with respect to prime corporate bonds (JP Morgan Maggie European 
credit risk index) overcomes the III° quartile of its daily distribution. Marginal effect is the change in the 
probability to have trade which corresponds to unit variation in an explicative variable by maintaining the others 
fixed. Regarding continuous explicative variables, average marginal effects, on the probability to have a trade, are 
reported. Concerning dummy variables, marginal effects represent the change in the probability to have a trade, 
when the explicative variable goes from zero to one. 
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Table a4.1 - Matched pairs of fragmented and non-fragmented bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT 
 
non-fragmented bonds fragmented bonds 
ISIN  
MV 
(bln euros) 
maturity  
date 
rating 
lot size 
(euro) 
ISIN  
MV 
(bln euros) 
maturity  
date 
rating 
lot size 
(euro) 
Italian structured bonds 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003738470 252 8-Nov-10 A2 1,000 
IT0004053465 251 30-Jun-11 A2 1,000 IT0003747505 259 19-Jun-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003747521 252 16-Nov-10 A2 1,000 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003750368 252 22-Nov-10 A2 1,000 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003754113 252 30-Nov-10 A2 1,000 
IT0004053465 251 30-Jun-11 A2 1,000 IT0003754147 253 23-Jun-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003759096 252 10-Dec-10 A2 1,000 
IT0003933154 99 16-Nov-11 A2 1,000 IT0003764161 88 21-Jul-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003765291 252 20-Dec-10 A2 1,000 
IT0003035299 264 13-Dec-10 A2 1,000 IT0003792741 252 20-Jan-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003933154 99 16-Nov-11 A2 1,000 IT0003799795 94 3-Feb-12 A2 1,000 
IT0004036338 213 28-Apr-11 A2 1,000 IT0003801526 101 31-Jan-11 A2 1,000 
IT0004036338 213 28-Apr-11 A2 1,000 IT0003805220 212 28-Feb-11 A2 1,000 
IT0004576556 99 22-Mar-15 A2 1,000 IT0003806855 110 17-Feb-15 A2 1,000 
IT0003933154 99 16-Nov-11 A2 1,000 IT0003810626 51 3-Mar-12 A2 1,000 
IT0004036338 213 28-Apr-11 A2 1,000 IT0003812523 65 28-Feb-11 A2 1,000 
IT0004036338 213 28-Apr-11 A2 1,000 IT0003827679 252 29-Apr-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003821136 147 31-Mar-10 A2 1,000 IT0003832760 50 7-Apr-10 A2 1,000 
IT0003821136 147 31-Mar-10 A2 1,000 IT0003842983 25 5-May-10 A2 1,000 
IT0004053457 218 15-May-11 A2 1,000 IT0003846844 217 31-May-11 A2 1,000 
IT0004713654 119 10-Jun-15 A3 1,000 IT0003855779 63 30-May-15 A2 1,000 
IT0003933154 99 16-Nov-11 A2 1,000 IT0003855795 111 30-Jun-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003740047 23 5-Oct-12 Aa3 1,000 IT0003883185 20 29-Jul-12 A2 1,000 
IT0003740047 23 5-Oct-12 Aa3 1,000 IT0003890248 22 1-Sep-12 A2 1,000 
IT0004854490 19 7-Dec-15 A3 1,000 IT0003935241 127 6-Dec-15 A2 1,000 
IT0003933154 99 16-Nov-11 A2 1,000 IT0004057151 40 30-Jun-11 A2 1,000 
IT0003657563 322 31-May-14 A2 1,000 IT0004309313 362 30-Apr-14 Baa1 1,000 
IT0004375736 676 23-Sep-14 A2 1,000 IT0004315047 686 23-May-14 Baa1 1,000 
IT0004429202 588 27-Feb-15 A2 1,000 IT0004452386 556 28-Apr-15 A2 1,000 
IT0004642382 746 14-Oct-15 A3 1,000 IT0004464407 740 30-Jun-15 A2 1,000 
IT0004642382 746 14-Oct-15 A3 1,000 IT0004669138 1436 13-Dec-15 A2 1,000 
IT0001300992 95 22-Jan-19 A3 1,000 IT0004796451 101 3-Jun-18 A2 1,000 
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Table a4.1 - Matched pairs of fragmented and non-fragmented bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT 
 
non-fragmented bonds fragmented bonds 
ISIN  
MV 
(bln euros) 
maturity  
date 
rating 
lot size 
(euro) 
ISIN  
MV 
(bln euros) 
maturity  
date 
rating 
lot size 
(euro) 
Foreign structured bonds 
IT0006714395 7 16-Apr-21 A2 1,000 
DE000UB5WF7
8 
15 1-Apr-21 A1 1,000 
GB00B6HZ3D39 43 29-Jun-17 A2 1,000 
DE000UB8DSR
5 
14 6-Jul-17 A1 1,000 
GB00B6HZ2927 0.1 29-Jul-16 A2 1,000 DE000UU0E789 16 28-Sep-16 A1 1,000 
IT0004332240 214 28-Mar-12 A3 1,000 IT0004176787 282 30-Mar-12 A3 1,000 
IT0004372162 147 26-Jun-12 A3 1,000 IT0004218688 142 30-Mar-12 A3 1,000 
NL0006136376 11 28-Dec-12 A2 1,000 IT0006620220 36 28-Dec-12 A3 1,000 
IT0003793467 506 31-Jan-10 A3 1,000 IT0006623489 510 31-Jan-10 Baa1 1,000 
IT0006630344 786 20-Jul-13 A2 1,000 IT0006623620 531 3-Jun-13 Baa1 1,000 
IT0003806244 1010 28-Feb-10 A3 1,000 IT0006626201 1029 28-Feb-10 Baa1 1,000 
NL0006136376 11 28-Dec-12 A2 1,000 IT0006627563 85 30-Mar-13 Baa1 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006628876 176 30-Mar-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006632035 316 30-Apr-13 A3 1,000 
NL0006136376 11 28-Dec-12 A2 1,000 IT0006632613 70 30-Apr-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006632621 176 30-Apr-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006635384 69 6-Jun-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006635475 127 31-May-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006636770 176 29-Jun-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006638057 69 29-Jun-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006638842 65 29-Jun-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006640491 162 31-Jul-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006636218 186 9-Jul-13 A3 1,000 IT0006640509 122 3-Aug-13 A3 1,000 
NL0009569821 15 27-Oct-13 A2 1,000 IT0006643008 42 3-Aug-13 A3 1,000 
NL0009569821 15 27-Oct-13 A2 1,000 IT0006643016 73 31-Aug-13 A3 1,000 
NL0009569821 15 27-Oct-13 A2 1,000 IT0006646001 40 28-Sep-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006673401 206 30-Sep-13 A2 1,000 IT0006646019 121 28-Sep-13 A3 1,000 
IT0006630344 786 20-Jul-13 A2 1,000 IT0006664137 793 21-Jul-14 A1 1,000 
NL0009058122 184 31-Jul-14 A2 1,000 IT0006664459 259 23-Jul-14 A1 1,000 
NL0009294305 15 19-Apr-17 A2 1,000 IT0006719584 36 21-Apr-17 A1 1,000 
NL0009403229 21 3-May-17 A2 1,000 IT0006719956 20 8-Jun-17 A1 1,000 
IT0006719816 15 30-Jun-16 A2 1,000 IT0006720129 26 7-Jul-16 A2 1,000 
NL0009597939 14 18-Oct-17 A2 1,000 IT0006721366 19 19-Oct-17 A1 1,000 
IT0006602871 21 13-Mar-16 Baa1 1,000 IT0006721473 20 3-Nov-16 A1 1,000 
NL0009487461 98 9-Jul-16 A2 1,000 NL0009537851 99 30-Sep-16 A2 1,000 
NL0009597939 14 18-Oct-17 A2 1,000 NL0009537935 29 30-Sep-17 A2 1,000 
NL0009487461 98 9-Jul-16 A2 1,000 NL0009537943 97 30-Sep-16 A2 1,000 
NL0009560028 101 30-Sep-17 A2 1,000 NL0009560010 97 30-Sep-17 A2 1,000 
IT0006716564 49 30-Oct-25 A2 1,000 XS0584356942 43 31-Jan-26 A3 1,000 
GB00B78SXC73 7 23-Mar-18 A2 1,000 XS0625841142 20 10-May-18 A3 1,000 
GB00B78SXC73 7 23-Mar-18 A2 1,000 XS0638296920 7 25-Jun-18 A3 1,000 
GB00B6HZ2927 0.1 29-Jul-16 A2 1,000 XS0663929619 15 7-Sep-16 A3 1,000 
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Table a4.1 - Matched pairs of fragmented and non-fragmented bank bonds traded on DomesticMOT 
 
non-fragmented bonds fragmented bonds 
ISIN  
MV 
(bln euros) 
maturity  
date 
rating 
lot size 
(euro) 
ISIN  
MV 
(bln euros) 
maturity  
date 
rating 
lot size 
(euro) 
Italian plain vanilla bonds 
IT0004807159 713 23-Mar-15 . 50,000 IT0004596133 501 20-Apr-12 . 50,000 
IT0004779713 293 30-Jun-14 A3 1,000 IT0004540719 717 20-Nov-14 A2 1,000 
IT0004855554 36 30-Nov-14 A3 1,000 IT0004540842 38 20-Nov-14 A2 1,000 
IT0004842370 525 8-Oct-19 A3 1,000 IT0004608797 373 14-May-20 A2 1,000 
IT0004842370 525 8-Oct-19 A3 1,000 IT0004645542 315 15-Nov-20 A2 1,000 
IT0004780711 97 29-Jun-14 A3 1,000 IT0004725559 76 14-Jul-14 A2 1,000 
IT0001223889 274 8-May-13 A2 1,000 IT0004760721 512 2-Sep-13 A2 1,000 
IT0004842370 525 8-Oct-19 A3 1,000 IT0004863723 154 18-Oct-19 A2 1,000 
Foreign plain vanilla bonds 
IT0004618507 22 28-Jun-16 A3 1,000 IT0006719428 18 14-Apr-16 A2 1,200 
IT0004618507 22 28-Jun-16 A3 1,000 IT0006719436 36 14-Apr-16 A2 1,400 
IT0004618507 22 28-Jun-16 A3 1,000 IT0006719444 44 14-Apr-16 A2 1,000 
IT0004698178 278 3-Jul-16 A3 1,000 NL0009354505 201 22-Feb-16 A2 1,000 
IT0004650781 79 22-Oct-20 A3 1,000 NL0009483825 251 22-Jun-20 A2 1,000 
DE000UB2F5S4 74 29-Jul-17 A1 1,000 NL0009560002 93 30-Sep-17 A2 1,000 
IT0004650781 79 22-Oct-20 A3 1,000 NL0009694272 101 14-Feb-21 A2 1,000 
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Table a4.2 - Liquidity indicators for banks bonds traded on DomesticMOT by fragmentation 
(average percentage values over the sample period; January 2010 – June 2013) 
 
Whole sample 
 
liquidity 
indicator 
parametric test (difference between average 
values) 
not parametric  
Wilcoxon test  
(difference 
between 
distributions) 
result 
dual-listed 
average value 
(a) 
non-fragmented 
 average value 
(b) 
(a)-(b) 
Zero-trade 33.6 27.3 *** 3.6*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
positive: dual-listed bonds are less liquid 
Turnover 1.8 2.4 *** -3.5*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
negative: dual-listed bonds are less liquid 
Amihud 23.3 16.5 *** 4.8*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
positive: dual-listed bonds are less liquid 
Roll 54.0 59.0  -0.2 not significantly different 
 
Italian bonds 
 
liquidity 
indicator 
parametric test (difference between average 
values) 
not parametric  
Wilcoxon test  
(difference 
between 
distributions) 
result 
dual-listed 
 (a) 
non-fragmented 
matched sample 
(b) 
(a)-(b) 
Zero-trade 24.4 19.6 ** -5.7*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
negative: dual-listed bonds are more liquid 
Turnover 1.8 1.6  1.0 not significantly different 
Amihud 8.7 13.3 *** -3.5*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
negative: dual-listed bonds are more liquid 
Roll 40 50 ** -3.0*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
negative: dual-listed bonds are more liquid 
 
Foreign bonds 
 
liquidity 
indicator 
parametric test (difference between average 
values) 
not parametric  
Wilcoxon test  
(difference 
between 
distributions) 
result 
dual-listed 
 (a) 
non-fragmented 
matched sample 
(b) 
(a)-(b) 
Zero-trade 42.1 23.0 *** 5.2*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
positive: dual-listed bonds are less liquid 
Turnover 2.0 2.7 *** -3*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
negative: dual-listed bonds are less liquid 
Amihud 63.0 20.1 *** 4.9*** 
difference significantly different from zero and 
positive: dual-listed bonds are less liquid 
Roll 70 60  2.3** not significantly different 
 
Note: Non fragmented bonds are matched pairs with dual-listed securities on the basis of market value, maturity, rating, 
complexity, nationality of the financial instruments.(*** ) indicates that the difference between dual-listed and not fragmented 
bonds is significant at the 1% level; (**) indicates that the difference between dual-listed and not fragmented bonds is 
significant at the 5% level. 
Table a4.3 - Test of homogeneity between matched pairs 
 
 whole sample Italian bonds 
 F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value 
market value 2.3 0.07 1.4 0.3 
rating 1.1 0.4 0.8 0.6 
maturity 0.8 0.5 2.2 0.1 
 
In the table we report F-statistics applied to the coefficients of a multivariate regression in which the relations among 
differences between matched pairs liquidity indicators and differences between matched pairs characteristics (market value, 
rating, maturity) are examined. The F-statistic allows to test the hypothesis that all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
